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Few issues polarize the scientific commu-
nity within the field of creativity as the
purported association between creativity
and psychopathology. The idea that the
two are intimately linked dates back to
Greek antiquity where the mental state of
creative individuals during idea generation
was noted to be highly aberrant. However,
such eccentric states were not held to
reflect clinical levels of mental illness until
the 1800s (Becker, 2001).
The intuitive appeal of this connection
partly stems from the commonalities we
associate with mental illness and creativ-
ity, including a high tolerance for ambi-
guity, the ability to generate non-generic
conceptual connections, and the adop-
tion of alternative perspectives (Abraham,
in press). Moreover, higher than aver-
age incidences of mental illness are found
among people who practice professions
that demand high levels of creativity,
such as visual artists and writers (Kyaga
et al., 2011; Simonton, 2014). The infor-
mation processing mechanism that is gen-
erally proposed as underlying the link
between creativity and psychopathology is
that shortcomings during normative cog-
nition (e.g., cognitive disinhibition), that
are characteristic of certain psychiatric
populations (e.g., psychosis), may trans-
late to benefits in the context of creative
cognition (Carson, 2011).
There are, however, also good grounds
to be skeptical of the “mad genius” meme,
which some argue is a quixotic notion at
best (Schlesinger, 2009). For one thing,
many of the studies that have been used
to support this idea have come under a
lot of criticism on methodological counts
(Thys et al., 2014). Some have even shown
that the presence of psychopathological
traits explains only a paltry amount of the
variance in creative performance (Silvia
and Kimbrel, 2010). In addition, notwith-
standing notable exceptions (e.g., van
Gogh), individuals who achieved creative
eminence in their fields were not oper-
ating at peak levels of productivity when
they reached the point of severe mental
illness.
So how can we make sense of this
picture given that the evidence of a
positive relationship between creativity
and mental illness is clearly mixed? One
approach would be to breakdown the
empirical investigations that have assessed
this link into meaningful categories based
on a specific criterion and to evaluate
whether any systematic patterns emerge as
a result.
The madness-creativity link has, for
instance, been investigated by assessing
the performance of both psychiatric pop-
ulations as well as subclinical popula-
tions on measures of creativity (Kaufman,
2014). The most well studied psychiatric
populations in this regard include indi-
viduals with schizophrenia, bipolar disor-
der, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) and autism. Subclinical popula-
tions have also been widely assessed, and
these refer to high risk healthy popula-
tions who are defined as such because they
exhibit a high degree of mental illness-
relevant personality traits. The rationale
behind investigating subclinical groups is
that studying high-functioning individu-
als who show some degree of predispo-
sition for a clinical disorder enables us
to understand the workings of the infor-
mation processing biases related to that
disorder without the burden of having
to control for variables that can exert a
confounding effect in studies on clini-
cal populations (e.g., medication). Indeed,
much evidence points to similarities in
the information processing biases (e.g.,
latent disinhibition) typical of specific
clinical groups (e.g., schizophrenia) and
their respective subclinical populations
(e.g., high psychoticism or schizotypal
groups).
One means by which the creativity-
psychopathology link can be investigated
then is to focus on investigations of pop-
ulations that are documented to have
similar information processing biases and
to cluster these studies by the type of
population (clinical/subclinical) and the
severity of disorder (high/low dysfunc-
tion). Let’s take the premise that reduced
top-down down control (influence of
knowledge and expectations) on infor-
mation processing can have a facilitative
or debilitative effect on creative cogni-
tion. A number of psychiatric popula-
tions, such as ADHD and schizophrenia,
are associated with poor top-down con-
trol and corresponding fronto-striatal dys-
function (Bradshaw and Sheppard, 2000),
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FIGURE 1 | The hypothesized relationship between the capacity to generate original
responses during creative thinking (range: low to high) and the degree of functionality in
top-down control of information processing (range: normal to impaired).
but these vary greatly in terms of sever-
ity. ADHD is associated with top-down
deficits such as high levels of distractibility,
impulsivity and poor inhibitory control
functioning. But these are mild rela-
tive to those typically associated with
schizophrenia within domains like execu-
tive function, working memory, inhibitory
control and fluency. Milder still are neg-
ative biases in top-down control, such
as latent disinhibition, that have been
reported in subclinical groups. So does any
viable pattern emerge when clustering the
findings of such behavioral and neuropsy-
chological studies according to the degree
and/or type of top-down insufficiencies:
clinical-severe, clinical-moderate, and
subclinical-mild?
A number of studies on subclinical-
mild populations, such as individuals
who are characterized by the presence
of a high degree of either schizotypal
or psychoticism traits, have demonstrated
that they consistently perform better
than their low trait counterparts on
some measures of creativity (Schuldberg,
2005; Acar and Sen, 2013). The same is
true of populations who display clinical-
moderate levels of top-down dysfunc-
tion, such as ADHD (Abraham et al.,
2006; Healey and Rucklidge, 2006). In
contrast, populations who are charac-
terized by clinical-severe levels of top-
down dysfunction, such as schizophre-
nia, perform poorly on almost all mea-
sures of creativity (Abraham et al., 2007;
Jaracz et al., 2012). This pattern of find-
ings suggests that while subclinical-mild
and clinical-moderate levels of top-down
dysfunction can, under specific condi-
tions, confer selective advantages in cre-
ative cognition, clinical-severe levels of
top-down dysfunction leads to impover-
ished creative thinking. A minimal level of
function is probably essential to develop
the original ideas one generates into
something more tangible than a fleeting
thought.
The effects of alterations in top-
down control on creative perfor-
mance can therefore be parsimoniously
conceptualized in terms of an inverted-U
shaped function or an inverted backward-J
function (Figure 1). Direct investiga-
tions are necessary to reveal the precise
pattern of this relationship. While dif-
fuse or defocused top-down control in
information processing may abet cre-
ative cognition, too much (normal) or
too little (defective) top-down control can
hinder or disrupt the same (Abraham,
in press). An inverted-U function in
this context is postulated to account
for the abundance of conflicting find-
ings associated with investigating the
creativity-psychopathology link. The
strength of this hypothesis is that it is
one that readily lends itself to empirical
investigation.
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